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I. Introduction and Summary of Conclusions.
A. Issues
This memorandum is a comparative study of the rules of procedure and evidence
in a representative number of common law and civil law jurisdictions. The specific focus
of this survey is on the rules of procedure and evidence that help reduce the trauma of
witnesses, especially in relation to rape. At all times, the memorandum will focus on
those rules that protect the witness while not impinging upon the rights of the accused.1

B. Necessity for rules of procedure and evidence that reduce the trauma of
witnesses, especially rape victims.

The existence of witness friendly rules of procedure and evidence not only
minimize the psychological trauma for witnesses, it also serves several important judicial
goals. The successful conviction of a criminal in both common law and civil law
countries is extremely dependant upon the cooperation of witnesses. This dependence is
particularly acute in sexual assault cases since most crimes of sexual violence do not
occur out in the open. Even when committed in the context of war, when prosecuting
rape, courts must depend almost exclusively on the statement of the victim or a coconspirator. Witnesses will be more likely to come forward if the prosecutor can ensure
their physical and mental well-being. The high occurrence and prevalence of sexual
crimes will not be reduced until impunity for the perpetrators becomes less pronounced
through higher convictions and stronger punishments.

1

Issue # 19: Examination of witnesses- Complete a comparative study of rules of procedure and evidence
available in a representative number of common law and civil law jurisdictions to reduce the trauma of
witnesses, particularly in relation to rape, that do not impinge upon the rights of defense.

1

In the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, (ITCY) prosecutors
learned quickly just how dependent they were on witnesses for their success. The first
criminal brought to trial was Dusko Tadic. The indictment against him accused Tadic of
participating in and aiding and abetting the commission of rape, gang rape, sexual
mutilation and other sexual violence.2 Unfortunately, the prosecutor was forced to
remove the rape charges after its only rape witnesses suddenly refused to testify. She
explained that she was no longer willing to tell her story because there had been threats
against herself and her family.3 The rape charge failed because there were no willing
living witnesses.
The ability of a judicial body to protect witnesses gives the court power and
legitimacy. In order to administer justice a court or tribunal must be taken seriously if it
is to have a maximum deterrent effect against future crimes. If criminals are able to stop
witnesses from testifying by harming their families, intimidating them in the courtroom,
sullying their reputation or by any other means, then the judicial process will become
ineffective. A court’s legitimacy will suffer if either victims and witnesses or defendants
are harmed.4
Since legal systems around the world vary depending on their history and culture,
each has different rules of procedure and evidence that protect witnesses. This memo
will broadly explore the protections afforded witnesses in civil law countries including
2
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France, Germany, Denmark and Israel; common law countries including the United
States, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and Australia; and military/international
courts including the ITCY, the International Criminal Court, and the European Court of
Human Rights. The rules of procedure and evidence can be divided into three broad
categories; witness anonymity, rape shield provisions/limits on cross-examination, and
outside victims support.
Witnesses in rape and sexual assault cases should be granted varying degrees of
witness anonymity. Since the Tribunal does not have the resources to provide witnesses
with police protection or witness relocation program, witness anonymity is the only way
that the Tribunal can guarantee a witnesses’ safety.
The second way that the Tribunal can protect witnesses’ is by limiting crossexamination. With respect to rape victims, questions about their sexual history or general
morality should not be allowed. Judges should also limit the tone and kinds of questions
from the defense in order to stop the accused from unduly intimidating the witness.
Lastly, the Tribunal can provide counseling and other services to make rape
witnesses more comfortable. These provisions are directly linked to the amount of
resources available to the Tribunal. While such provisions would greatly reduce trauma
to witnesses, increasing such services is unlikely. Perhaps a wealthy non-government
organization could step in to fill these gaps.

II. Legal Discussion
A. The Rights of the Accused
A survey of the rules of procedure and evidence in countries around the world
reveals a wide variety of methods to reduce the trauma of testifying for witnesses. In all

3

jurisdictions the legislature and courts work to ensure that the protection of witnesses
does not impinge upon the rights of the accused. The rights of the accused vary
depending upon whether it is a civil law country, common law country or a military
tribunal. This paper will focus on the rights of the accused, as they exist in the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. The Statute and Rules of Procedure and
Evidence for the Tribunal is basically the same as the Statute and Rules for the
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia. Both purport to be a blend of traditions
from the common as well as civil law traditions.
According to Article 21 of the Statute for the International Tribunal for Rwanda,
the accused has a right to examination. Section e states that the accused has the right to:
“examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her and to obtain the
attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the same conditions
as witnesses against him or her.5” While the Tribunal also assigns other rights to the
accused, the right to cross-examine and confront witnesses is the right that most impacts
how witnesses are treated.
Much of the work of the ITCY has been centered around ascertaining exactly
what the right to cross-examine encompasses. The largest point of contention that the
Tribunal judges have argued over is which sources of law should dictate the rights of the
accused. This debate has been especially acute in the ITCY. Some ITCY Judges and
scholars argue that the Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence should be interpreted
with internationally recognized standards. Submissions to the Secretary General in the
United Nations on drafting the Statute all asked that basic human rights guarantees,
5

Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda..
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including those articulated in Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) be applied and included. However, in the course of deciding
whether or not to accept the prosecutions motion for witness protection, the ITCY
majority rejected the idea that “the case law of other international judicial bodies
interpreting the right of an accused to a fair trial establishes the minimum standards
which must be preserved in all judicial proceedings, including those of the International
Tribunal.6”
The scope of the rights of the accused in the ITCY depends upon which side of
the debate is stronger. If it is accepted that the Tribunal has the power to interpret the
Statute itself, then it is up to the Judges how the rights of the accused embedded in the
ITCY will be interpreted. On the other hand, if the ICCPR is accepted as the lowest
threshold for the rights of the accused then Article 14 and the interpretations of that right
by the Human Rights Committee governs.
Article 14 (3) (d)- (e) of the ICCPR states:
In determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be
entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality:
6

Legal scholars and Tribunal judges are split on whether to follow Judge McDonald’s assertion that the
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To be tried in his presence, and to defend himself in person or through
legal assistance of his own choosing….
To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him and to obtain the
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same
conditions as witnesses against him.7
The Human Rights Committee (HRC) interprets and applies the ICCPR.
According to the HRC, Article 14 (3) (e) was “designed to guarantee to the accused the
same legal powers of compelling attendance of witnesses and of examining or crossexamining any witness as are available to the prosecution.” In several cases the HRC
attempted to flesh out exactly what Article 14 encompasses. In Antonaccio v Uruguay,
the HRC found that the complainant’s Article 14 rights were violated by a trial held in
absentia. They ruled this way because he was unable to present his own witnesses, but
also because he was unable to cross-examine the witnesses against him.8
The HRC’s evaluation of Article 14 has not expressly ruled that the right to
confront a witness under the ICCPR encompasses a right to direct confrontation. It is
easy to understand why they would not draw this conclusion. The ICCPR is designed to
provide minimum guidelines for both civil and common-law countries. Given the fact
that the legal traditions of many of the countries party to the ICCPR vary so widely, the
HRC has chosen to guarantee rights that fit into the framework of both systems.
The right to confront and examine witnesses against the accused is one that exists
in many legal traditions around the world. Striking a balance between the need to protect
witnesses and the right of the accused to examine them is an issue that judges around the
world struggle with.9

7

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, reprinted in United Nations, Human Rights: A
Compilation of International Instruments 24-25. reproduced in notebook tab # 10
8
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9
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B. Rules of Procedure and Evidence that reduce the trauma to witnesses around the
world: Witness anonymity
For many witnesses, especially those who are also victims of rape, the prospect of
being identified by their attacker or the public at large holds them back from testifying at
trial. Some fear that if their attacker discovers their identity they will harm them or their
families. In certain communities, victims feel tremendous shame and embarrassment
when members of their community learn that they were sexually assaulted through media
or court publications. Fear of becoming an outcast or suffering further humiliation often
stops them from testifying.10
The anonymity of witnesses can be preserved to varying degrees. A court may
choose to not protect a witness’ identity at all by allowing the publication of witnesses’
names in the indictment and all public documentation. This would include publication of
their names by the media. Some jurisdictions choose to preserve a witness’ anonymity in
the media and in public documentation by only allowing those formally involved in the
trial to have access to the identity of witnesses. Any information including means of
identification such as photographs or sketches of witnesses would be removed from all
public records. The media would also be prohibited from publishing information about
witnesses.11
A court can also choose to keep the identity of witnesses from the accused. By
denying the accused access to the names or identifying features of witnesses the court can
10

Jocelyn Campanaro, Women War and International Law: The Historical Treatment of Gender Based
War Crimes, 89 Geo. L.J. 2557 (2001) this article addresses the effects of rape generally, reproduced in
notebook tab # 11
11
Simon Bronitt, The Use and Abuse of Counseling Records in Sexual Assault Trials: Reconstructing the
Rape Shield?, 8 Crim. L.F. 259 (1997) reproduced in notebook tab # 12
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preserve the witnesses’ anonymity. Testimony could be with technology that alters the
witnesses’ voice, from behind a screen or with closed circuit televisions in order to keep
the witnesses’ identity from the defendant. Court officials, including the judges of the
court or tribunal would have the witness’ information. In some circumstances the
identity of the witness would be kept from the perpetrators’ attorneys as well.12
Judicial bodies in common and civil law countries have grappled with exactly
how and when to grant witness anonymity and to what degree. An examination of the
rules developed in a representative number of civil and common-law countries reveals a
general pattern. In most countries the question of when to grant witness anonymity and
to what extent requires striking a balance between the threat to the witness and the rights
of the accused.
Common Law Countries
Britain’s treatment of witness anonymity and confidentiality measures

Through court rulings and legislation from Parliament, England and Whales offer
witnesses levels of anonymity depending upon the circumstances of the case. According
to the Victim’s Charter, if a person has been raped or sexually assaulted their identity will

12
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not be revealed in court, ever. It is a criminal offence for anyone to publish the name,
address, photograph or other details of a rape or sexual assault victim.13
Some witnesses are permitted to give evidence under pseudonyms and from
behind screens with their voices disguised through voice-distortion equipment. A series
of cases established how judges should evaluate when to allow testimony under such
circumstances. In Regina v D.J.X., S.C.Y. and G.C.Z., the Court of Appeals focused on
the judge’s duty to ensure that justice was served. According to the opinion, “the learned
judge has the duty on this and on all other occasions of endeavoring to see that justice is
done…What it really means is, he has got to see that the system operates fairly: fairly not
only to the defendants but also to the prosecution and also to the witnesses. Sometimes he
has to make decisions as to where the balance of fairness lies.14” The court in Regina v
D.J.X., S.C.Y. and G.C.Z. believed that the decision to allow a witness to testify behind a
screen and with voice alteration was largely up to the judge’s discretion.
A few years later another British court developed a more detailed test to decide
when to grant anonymity. The test in Regina v Watford Magistrates Court ex parte
Lenman and Others involved assessing the risk to the administration of justice with the
witnesses’ fear for their safety. The bench must be satisfied that there was a real risk to
the judicial process because a witness on reasonable grounds feared for his safety. When
this happened, then it was within the judges’ powers to take appropriate steps to ensure
the witness’s safety.15

13

United Kingdom Home Office, “Victim’s Charter,” http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk.cpd/pvu/vichap.htm
(accessed September 15, 2002). Reproduced in notebook tab # 17
14
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9

The court allowed three witnesses to testify anonymously in a murder trial in the
case of Regina v Brindle and Brindle. According to this case the test for granting such
anonymity centered on whether:
There is a real danger that a witness will not give evidence because of a genuine
fear of the consequences if his identity becomes know, then the witness must be
given such protection as the Court is able to provide. I use the word ‘genuine fear’
as opposed to ‘justified fear’ because it seems to me that it is the state of mind of
the witness, which is vital. If he is afraid, and if that fear is genuine, then it is not
conclusive that no direct threat has been made to him. It seems to me (the judge_
sufficient if he genuinely fears retribution and that fear may stem from what some
might call rumor or gossip….16
This test elicited criticism for reflecting so little consideration for the rights of the
accused. Later courts fine-tuned this approach to witness anonymity to reflect the needs
of the defendant as well as his accusers.
Applying Regina v Watford Magistrates Court ex parte Lenman and Others, the
court in Regina v Taylor found that the right to see and know the identity of witnesses
could be denied in “rare and exceptional circumstances” only. It also established
guidelines for judges when they considered whether or not they should allow a witness’
identity to be kept from both the public and the accused.
1. There must be real ground for fear of the consequences if the evidence were
given and the identity of the witness was revealed.
2. The evidence must be sufficiently relevant and important to make it unfair to
make the Crown proceed without it.
3. The Crown must satisfy the court that the creditworthiness of the witness has
been fully investigated and disclosed.
4. The court must be satisfied that there would be no undue prejudice to the
accused although some prejudice is inevitable, even if it is only the qualification
placed on the right to confront the witness as accuser.
5. The court should balance the need for protection of the witness, including the
extent of that protection, against unfairness or the appearance of unfairness.17

16
17

Regina v. Brindle and Brindle T.L.R. 345 (1985). Reproduced in notebook tab # 20
Id.
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Britain’s Criminal Justice Act provides for an even more extreme form of
anonymity for a witness. According to the Criminal Justice Act, 1988 section 23 (1) a
statement made by a witness can be admissible in court as a substitute for the witnesses
actually testifying when: “the statement was made to a police officer or some other
person charged with the duty of investigating offences or charging offenders and the
person who made it does not give oral evidence through fear or because he is kept out of
the way.” 18 Attorneys for the defense would obviously prefer that a witness testify from
behind a screen with voice alteration, than have their statement read in court. The
anonymity granted under this provision of the Criminal Justice Act completely deprives
the accused’ right to confront through cross-examination.19
Degrees of Anonymity in Australia
The controlling case in Australia concerning when the court may conceal the
identity of its witness from the accused is Jarvie and Another v. Magistrates Court of
Victoria. While the case concerns a claim for anonymity for an undercover police
operative, the Judge expressly noted that the ruling was not limited to police operatives.
The decision applied “to other witnesses whose personal safety may be endangered by
the disclosure of their identity.20” The opinion draws a parallel between witness
anonymity and the principles of exclusion of evidence based on public interest immunity.
18
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In Australia, certain documentary evidence can be excluded if their disclosure is contrary
to public interest. This precedent was set in the case of Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co
Ltd.21 The court in Jarvie, found that the principles in that case applied to oral as well as
documentary evidence. According to the opinion the relevant factors in witness
anonymity is whether there is a real threat of danger, injury, or death to the witness and
the non-effectiveness of witness protection programs.
The Jarvie court emphasized weighing all factors against the value of knowing
the identity of the witness to the preparation of the defense. If there was good reason to
believe that disclosure of the witness’ identity may be of substantial assistance to the
defendant in preparing their case then witness anonymity should not be granted in
Australian courts. However, the court pointed out that if knowing the witness’ identity
would only be of slight assistance then it should be granted. The Australian court
emphasized that anonymity will not be granted lightly. It disregarded reasons such as the
prevention of embarrassment to the witness, invasion of privacy or personal damage as a
result of media coverage.
The Australian Evidence Act 1989 makes provisions for “special witnesses.” A
special witness is “a person who in the court’s opinion would be likely to suffer severe
emotional trauma or would be likely to be so intimidated as to be disadvantaged as a
witness.22” The Act allows for special arrangements to be made for the giving of
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evidence by these witnesses including exclusion of the public or the defendant from the
court. It also allows for the admission of videotaped testimony instead of direct.23
The United State, the Sixth Amendment and grants of anonymity
In general United States courts shy away from granting witness confidentiality or
anonymity except where children are involved. The Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution ensures that the accused has the right to confront any witnesses
against him. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of
an accused in a criminal prosecution “to be confronted with the witnesses against him”
which courts have found, “means more than being allowed to confront the witness
physically.24 “The main and essential purpose of confrontations is to secure for the
opponent the opportunity of cross-examination.25” The United States grant of a right to
confrontation is different that the ITCR’s right to examination.
Courts in the United States extremely reluctant to impinge upon this right and
therefore rarely grants any degree of witness anonymity. However, there are several
Federal court cases in which the court has recognized that the rights afforded by the Sixth
Amendment are not absolute. The rulings in these cases are narrow and usually concern
releasing the address of a witness or his/her family’s address. Testimony under
pseudonyms, behind screens or with voice alteration has not been allowed except when
the witness was a child or someone with diminished mental capacity.
In Delaware v Van Arsdal, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) the Supreme Court found that the
defendant’s right to full confrontation must occasionally give way to competing
government interests including the prevention of victim harassment, jury prejudice,
23
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confusion of issues or danger to witness. While the case concerned the limits of crossexamination, other judges could use this ruling to support an argument for some degree
of witness anonymity.26
In United States v Rich, F.2d 415 (2nd Cir. 1958) the Supreme Court held that
withholding the address of a witness because of personal danger to him/her was
acceptable.27 In United States v Crovedi,467 F.2d 1032 (7th Cir. 1972) United States
Court of Appeals in the 7th Circuit upheld a ruling that the new identities and location of
two witnesses be kept from the defense and the public at large. The witnesses were given
immunity in exchange for their testimony against a co-conspirator. In order to guarantee
their safety the government placed them and their families in witness protection. The
court ruled that there was “no abuse of discretion in a determination that these witnesses
had reason to fear that disclosure of their present identities would endanger themselves
and their families.28
United States v. Rangel, 534 F.2d 147 (9th Cir. 1976) granted a similar protection
to witnesses who feared for their safety. The Seventh Circuit “did not establish a rigid
rule of disclosure (of the true name, home address and phone number of informants), but
rather discussed disclosure against a background of factors weighing conversely, such as
personal safety of the witness.”29United State v. Ellis, 468 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1972) upheld
the right to suppress the real name, residence and occupation of under cover police
officers.30

26

Delaware v Van Arsdal, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) reproduced in notebook tab # 26
United States v Rich, 262 F.2d 415, 419 (2nd Cir. 1958) reproduced in notebook tab # 27
28
United States v Crovedi, 467 F.2d 1032, 1035. (7th Cir. 1972) reproduced in notebook tab # 28
29
United States v Rangel, 534 F.2d 147, 148. (9th Cir. 1976) reproduced in notebook tab # 29
30
United States v. Ellis, 468 F. 2d 638, 639. (9th Cir. 1972) reproduced in notebook tab #30
27

14

The important point of these Supreme Court and Federal cases is that courts will
rarely grant witness anonymity. On the few occasions that they do the anonymity usually
only extends to the address, real name or other personal identification of the witness. It
does not allow for witnesses to testify from behind screens, with voice alteration or
through written statements.
Journalists and the media are generally permitted to print the names of rape
victims and other judicial witnesses.31 The First Amendment protects the publication of
truthful information. In order to override that protection a state must show a compelling
interest.32 Generally, rape victims will not win privacy suits brought against newspapers
or news agencies that identify them. Some reason that publishing the victim’s name and a
personal detail promotes truth and helps reduce the stigma of sexual crimes. Others
argue that publishing a rape victims’ name may cause embarrassment and cause victims
to be reluctant to future crimes.33
It should be noted that while they are under no legal obligation to do so, most
reporters do not print the names of rape or sexual assault victims. Many of the large
media corporations in the United States have made non-disclosure a corporate policy.34
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New Zealand’s take on witness anonymity
In response to several court cases that ruled against witness anonymity,
Parliament enacted the Evidence Witness Anonymity Amendment Bill. It later became
sections 13B to 13J of the Evidence Act 1908.
According to the legislation a judge may make an order permitting a witness to
testify anonymously at trial if he is satisfied that:
a) the safety of the witness or of any other person is likely to be endangered, or
there is likely to be serious damage to property, if the witness’ identity s
disclosed; and
b) either: i) there is no reason to believe that the witness has a motive or tendency
to be untruthful, having regard (where applicable) to the witness’ previous
convictions or the witness’s relationship with the accused or any associates of the
accused; or ii) the witness’s credibility can be tested properly without disclosure
of the witness’ identity and
c) the making of the order would not deprive the accused of a fair trial.35

The Civil Law and Anonymity
Grants of anonymity are less controversial in civil law countries since the judicial
process is not an adversarial one as it is in common law countries. Judges control civil
law trials. They are not structured as adversarial contests, which makes it easier to
accommodate the interests of victims at trial without disturbing the adversarial balance
that is central to common law criminal trials. Like most legal issues in civil law countries
a great deal of discretion is given to the judge in determining issues of witness
anonymity. As one commentator observed in civil law countries “the general tendency is
to rely on the skill, competence and experience of a professional judge.36”
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German courts view of witness anonymity
The German Criminal Procedure Code (StrafprozeBordnung, StPO) has several
provisions that allow German judges to protect a witness’ identity. Chapter VI § 68 (3)
states: “If there is reason to fear that revealing the identity or the place of residence or
whereabouts of the witness would endanger the witness’ or another person’s life, limb or
liberty, the witness may be permitted not to state personal particulars or to state
particulars only of an earlier identity.”37
Part II Chapter VI § 247 a. allows the judge to examine a witness in another place.
The examination can take place elsewhere if “there is an imminent risk of serious
detriment to the well-being of the witness were he to be examined in the presence of
those attending the main hearing.38” The judge must first assess whether “that risk cannot
be averted in some other way, namely removing the defendant and by excluding the
public.39”
When a witness’ security is in question, a German judge may decide not to
divulge the identity of a witness at any state of the criminal process. In these
circumstances, the witness is permitted to testify to a police officer. The officer will then
present the witness’ testimony in court. The court may create a list of questions it wishes
to be asked of the witness before they testify to the officer. Since this process provides
the defense with no opportunity to examine the witness, the court requires further
circumstantial evidence to convict when such anonymity is granted.40
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Denmark’s view of witness anonymity
The Denmark Act on Court Procedure is one of the few codes that does not
explicitly grant the accused a right to know the identity of prosecution witnesses. The
Danish Supreme Court has addressed witness anonymity several times. Generally they
have held that a witness whose life and safety will be endangered by giving evidence is
not obligated to do so. However, if they are prepared to give evidence in spite of the
danger, the anonymity may be granted.41
Israel’s Evidence Ordinance permits anonymity
Israel’s Evidence ordinance permits a small degree of witness anonymity. Section
10A (b) allows the “written statement of a person to be submitted in evidence provided it
is made by a person who is not a witness before the court and the court is satisfied that
improper means have not been used to dissuade or prevent the person from testifying.42”
However, in order to protect the accused from bias a person cannot be convicted in Israel
on the basis of this statement alone.
France’s provisions for witness’s confidentiality
Oddly, a survey of the French Criminal Procedure Code does not reveal a single
provision addressing witness confidentiality or anonymity. Since the majority of French
jurisprudence remains un-translated this in no way means that the French have not
addressed this subject.
However, given the fact that magistrates and judges are responsible almost
exclusively for the examination of witnesses, the French may have less of a need to
Christine Chinkin, International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Amicus Curiae Brief on Protective
Measures for Victims and Witnesses, 7 Crim. L.F. 179, 198-199 (1996). Reproduced in notebook tab # 13
41
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specifically address such concerns. The right to confrontation does not exist in France in
the same fashion as in American and British courts. Witnesses may be examined without
the defendant being present at the discretion of the judge. The magistrate or judge must
simply report the findings of the examination to the defense.43
Anonymity and the ITCY
The ITCY had an opportunity to evaluate issues of anonymity in its very first
trial. The ITCY Prosecutors’ office filed a motion asking for protective measures
applicable to witnesses in the case of Prosecutor V Tadic. They asked that some of their
witnesses receive “confidentiality” meaning that they would not be identified to the
public and the media. For others they requested “anonymity” which would prohibit the
victims and witnesses from being identified by the accused or his lawyers.44
The issue of confidentiality or public disclosure was easier for the ITCY to
evaluate because the Rules of Procedure expressly provide for such measures. The Trial
Chamber granted the motion and ordered that the names and details of witnesses only be
given in closed sessions. In arriving at this decision, the Trial Chamber consulted the
Rules and Statue of the Tribunal. Rule 75 outlines the measures that judges can take in
order to protect victims and witnesses. First “a Judge or a Chamber may…order
appropriate measures for the privacy and protection of witnesses, provided that the
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measures are consistent with the rights of the accused.” The rule further allows judges to
order:
Measures to prevent disclosure to the public or the media of the identity or
whereabouts of a victim or witness, or of persons related to or associated with a
victim or witnesses by such means as:
a) expunging names and identifying information from the Tribunal’s
public records
b) non-disclosure to the public of any records identifying the victim;
c) giving of testimony through image-or voice altering devises or closed
circuit television and
d) assignment of a pseudonym.45

Given the wording of Rule 75, it was easy for the Trial Chamber to find in favor of the
Prosecutors’ motion that certain witnesses receive confidentiality. The decision to grant
or deny motions of confidentiality for witnesses and victims was left mostly to the
discretion of the Trial Chamber. The Trial Chamber has ordered similar measures of
confidentiality in other ITCY cases. In the Celebici Camp case, they granted a motion
filed jointly by the prosecution and the defense. The motion asked that the names of
potential witnesses or other identifying data not be released to the public or the media.46
On the issue of anonymity, the Trial Chamber did not find that the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence or the Tribunal’s Statute authorized such a motion. However, on
the basis of customary international law the Trial Chamber produced a five-prong test
that must be met in order to grant a motion of witness anonymity. First there must be an
“existence of a real fear for the safety of the witness.47” According to the Trial Chamber,
this prong should be evaluated through an objective perspective. In order to support this
45
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requirement they relied upon Regina v. Taylor, a case from Britain. The British court
echoed the Trial Chamber’s requirement almost verbatim by ruling that “there must be
real grounds for being fearful of the consequences if the evidence given and the identity
of the witness is revealed.48”
Secondly, the prosecution has to show that the “testimony of the witness [is]
sufficiently relevant and important to the case.” Next “there must be no prima facie
evidence of the witness’s unworthiness in any way. This requirement focuses on the
reliability of the witness. By including this requirement the Trial Chamber seemed to be
protecting the ITCY from testimony of witnesses with extensive criminal backgrounds.
In their opinion, the Trial Chamber required the Prosecutor to perform a thorough
background check of witnesses and file a report of their reliability with the Court and the
Defense.49
The fourth element of the test is that no witness protection program exists. This
prong reflects the circumstances under which ITCY witnesses live. The Trial Chamber
recognized that most potential witnesses “live in the territory of the former Yugoslavia or
have family members who still live there and fear that they or their family members may
be harmed, either out of revenge for rendering evidence or in order to deter others.50”
These circumstances hold true for witnesses under the ITCR as well. Since the Tribunal
has no police force that can guarantee the safety of witnesses before during and after the
proceedings or a long-term witness protection program, witness anonymity might be the
most effective protective measure available.
48

Id.
Mercedeh Momeni, Balancing the Procedural Rights of the Accused Against a Mandate to Protect
Victims and Witnesses: An Examination of the Anonymity Rules of the International Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 41 How. L.J. 155, 165-166 (1997). Reproduced in notebook tab # 39
50
Decision of the ITCY Trial Chamber, 66.
49

21

The last element is that less restrictive protective measures are unavailable. This
requirement highlights the Chamber’s concern for the defendant’s rights. While they
acknowledged that some prejudice would happen if anonymity was granted they also
noted that the ITCY “must be satisfied that the accused suffers no undue avoidable
prejudice.51”
The defense argued that granting witnesses anonymity violated the accused right
to “examine or have examined witnesses against him” that the Statute of the ITCY grants
him52. In spite of this argument the Trial Chamber stood by their decision, ruling that
provided the Defense is given an opportunity to question an anonymous witness the
accused rights have not been violated.53 They further instituted procedural guidelines to
further protect the accused in situations under which anonymity has been granted. These
procedural guidelines are based on the European Court of Human Rights decision in
Kostovski v Netherlands.54
First, “the judges must be able to observe the demeanor of the witness, in order to
assess the reliability of the testimony.55” The judges must know the identity of the
witness so that they can test the witness’ reliability. Also, the defense “must be allowed
ample opportunity to question the witness of issues unrelated to his or her identity or
current whereabouts, such as how the witness was able to obtain incriminating
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information.56” Finally, once the reasons to fear for the security of the witness has passed
their identity must be released.
The Trial Chamber’s decision prompted widespread criticism from many legal
scholars primarily in the United States and Australia. While the majority found support in
international law for allowing witness anonymity, Judge Stephen strongly dissented. His
dissenting opinion supports other protective measures, but rejects the use of completely
anonymous witnesses as contrary to the Statute, The Rules and “internationally
recognized standards of the rights of the accused.57”Judge Stephens agrees with the
majority that witnesses need to be protected, however he suggests that they should be
limited to in camera proceedings and careful control of cross-examination. Witness
protection methods should not include “any wholesale anonymity of witnesses.” In the
end he grants “most of the relief sought by the prosecution, much of which is assented to
by the defense” but stopped short of “denying to the defense, including the accused, the
right to see and hear witnesses give evidence before the Tribunal and know their
identity.58”
56
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In arriving at his conclusion, Judge Stephens relies on many of the same cases
that Judge McDonald does he just interrupts them differently. First he relies upon the
wording of the Statue of the Tribunal and the legislative history provided by the Secretary
General’s Report. According to Judge Stephens, “the Statute does not authorize
anonymity of witnesses where this would in a real sense affect the right of the accused
specified in Article 21 and in particular the minimum guarantee in (4).59”
Next he takes issue with the majority’s interpretation of when not disclosing a
witness’ identity is acceptable. According to Stephens, such a measure is only
contemplated in Rule 69 as a pre-trial measure until the witness is within the ITCY’s
protection.60 According to him, rule 75 can be limited to preventing the disclosure of the
witnesses’ identity to the public or the media. He does not agree that Rule 75 B (iii) was
meant to include the use of anonymous witnesses. If the Secretary General had intended
such an outcome he would not have “introduced so radical a concept by indirect and
ambiguous wording, especially after specific and elaborate provisions for full disclosure
have been made.61” The fact that Rule 75A is made expressly subject to the “rights of the
accused” also lead Jude Stephens to find that the use of anonymous witnesses is
inconsistent with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.62
Judge Stephan also looks at the same ECHR case that Judge McDonald discussed,
Kostovski v Netherlands. The case found that using anonymous witnesses “involved
limitation on the rights of the defense which were irreconcilable with the guarantees
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contained in Article 6.63”(Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms) Article 6 outlines the right to examine witnesses and according
to Judge Stephens bears a striking resemblance to the right to examine found in Article
21 (4) (e) of the Tribunal’s Statute. The Statute is based on the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights, which was based on the ECHR.64
He also distinguishes Taylor and Jarvie, two of the cases relied upon by the
majority. First he points out that the witnesses in Jarvie were undercover police officers.
Their identity was already known to the defendant but not their true names.65 He
distinguishes Taylor by pointing out that the counsel for the defense was permitted to see
the witness and cross examine her while the defendant watched on a video screen.66
It is difficult to properly evaluate the majority’s decision without first putting it in
the proper context. The proceedings of the Tribunal are sufficiently different that those
of domestic courts or other international adjudicatory bodies. Given the limited and
unique scope of crimes before the Tribunal, the rules of procedure and evidence should
not be viewed through the critical eye of American or European jurisprudence. The
Tribunal’s statute limits them to prosecuting rape as a war crime, genocide, or a crime
against humanity. The very nature of these crimes requires that the Prosecutor establish a
pattern of behavior. In the context of a war crime (or genocide or crime against
humanity), the actual identity of the witness matters less than in most rape trials. In
domestic courts when a person is accused of rape, the reliability and motives of the
accuser are relevant to the defense. In the context of a military conflict, rape is not just
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rape, it is a military strategy designed to defeat the enemy. Women in Rwanda were not
raped or sexually assaulted because of who they were as individuals. They were targeted
because their ethnic identity.
Another point that should be taken into consideration is the unique nature of the
ITCY’s procedure. There are no jury trials as there are in an adversarial system like the
United States. The fact that a panel of judges will decide the fate of the accused serves to
balance out any damage that might be done to the accused when witness anonymity is
granted.
The International Criminal Court’s take on witness anonymity
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court were
written after the Preparatory Commission surveyed the rules of the dominant legal
systems, the ITCY and the ITCR. The ICC Rules for witness anonymity are similar to
the ones found in the ITCY. Since the ICC came into existence in July 2002 and has not
yet prosecuted anyone, it remains to be seen how these rules will be applied.
Subsection II provides measure for the “protection of victims and witnesses.”
Rule 87 of Subsection II allows the court to protect a witness’ identity by withholding the
release to the public or press of the identity or location of a witness.67 It also allows the
ICC to expunge any information that may lead to the witness’ identification from the
public records of the Chamber.68 The Court will hold in camera hearings to determine
when such measures are necessary.
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Justices of the ICC may allow testimony to be presented by electronic or other
special means “including the use of technical means enabling the alteration of pictures or
voice” under rule 87.69 They may also assign a pseudonym to the witness.70
The European Court of Human Rights
Issues of witness anonymity have come up frequently in the European Court of
Human Rights. In general the Court has deferred to national courts, encouraging them to
determine their procedure provided they are fair. The European Court of Human Rights
tends to take a case-by-case analysis of whether or not varying degrees of witness
anonymity violate the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (hereinafter, Convention).
The complainant in Unterpertinger v Austria argued that there was a violation of
Article 6 (3) (d)71 because two of the witnesses against him refused to appear in court.
He was convicted on the basis of statements made by the witnesses to the police. The
accused was given no opportunity to examine them.
The court found a violation of Article 6 (3) (d) because the accused rights were
greatly restricted by his inability to question the witnesses against him. However, they
did point out that just because a witness refusing to testify prevents the defense from
examining the witness orally does not automatically create a violation of Article 6 (3) (d).
To support this conclusion they pointed to the fact that Austria was not the only country
69
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who’s Code of Criminal Procedure permitted witnesses to refuse to testify. The violation
was based on the unique facts in the specific case.72
Both the majority and Judge Stephen relied upon Kostovski v the Netherlands in
deciding whether to grant witness anonymity or not. According to the ECHR, the use of
statements by anonymous witnesses is subject to stricter requirements than those
established in previous case law. It established these stricter requirements in the
following rule: a witness’ statement
“must have been taken down by a judge who (a) is aware of the identity of the
witness, (b) has expressed, in the official record of the hearing of such a witness,
his reasoned opinion as to the reliability of the witness and as to the reasons for
the wish of the witness to remain anonymous and (c) has provided the defense
with some opportunity to put questions or have questions put to the witness.

The court also stipulated that a written document containing the statement of an
anonymous witness may be used in evidence if:
(a) the defense has not at any stage of the proceedings asked to be allowed to
question the witness concerned, (b) the conviction is based to a significant extent
on other evidence not derived from anonymous sources and (c) the trial court
makes it clear that it has made use of the statement of the anonymous witness
with caution and circumspection.73

In Delta v France, the European Court agreed that there had been a violation of
Article 6 (3) (d) because the state failed to bring a key witness of a robbery to court. The
French court relied only upon the statements of the witnesses to the police in order to
convict. The conviction did not (as Kostovski dictates) rely upon any other evidence. The
72
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defense was given no opportunity to confront the witnesses. Since France was unable to
make an argument of special circumstances justifying anonymity, the European Court
found a violation.74
In an Austrian case, the accused was convicted based on the testimony of two
anonymous witnesses. The two witnesses in Windisch v Austria said that they saw a man
who they identified as the accused behaving suspiciously in the street. They did not see
him commit the crime in question. Since they feared reprisal, their names were not
released to the court, nor was the court able to see their body language to gage their
credibility. This was the only evidence used to obtain the conviction. Since the Austrian
court instituted no procedural guidelines to help soften the blow to the defense of witness
anonymity (like the judge being able to see the witness and the need for other evidence to
convict), the European Court found a violation of the accused rights.75
The accused in Isgro v Italy complained to the European Court because he was
convicted in Italy on the basis of statements made to the investigating judge by a witness
who did not appear at trial. The accused did know the witness’ identity and had been
given an opportunity to put questions to the witness through the judge. The European
Court found no violation of his rights because he had been able to ask questions and
discuss the witness’ statements in court. They also found no violation because there was
other evidence to support the conviction.76
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In most cases involving witness anonymity, the European Court finds a violation
of Article 6 (3). Their rulings demonstrate their desire to encourage domestic trials to be
fair by allowing the accused the right to examine a witness against them. Their tendency
to find against witness anonymity does not mean that they are wholly against it. The
European Court evaluates the fairness of a trial by looking at it holistically. In order for
there not to be an Article 6 violation, a domestic court must create procedural safeguards
that restore the balance between the rights of the accused and the witness when they use
anonymity. The Kostovski v the Netherlands case demonstrates the fact that the European
Court recognizes situations in which witness anonymity must be granted. This case
outlines the circumstances under which is can be granted.
C. Judicial Limits on Cross-Examination and Rape Shield Laws
Another way in which rules of procedure and evidence can reduce witness trauma
is by limiting cross-examination. Depending on the jurisdiction, some courts forbid
certain types and lines of questioning when the witness is a victim of sexual assault.
Issues concerning a victim’s past sexual history or general morality are not allowed in
most common or civil law courts. These rules are often called “Rape Shield provisions.”
The International Criminal Court and the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
also forbid questioning a victim of sexual assault about these issues. A few rules of
procedure and evidence direct judges generally to limit testimony that they believe might
re-traumatize a witness.
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Australia, Canada, United Kingdom and the United States enact Rape Shield Laws
Until recently, a rape victim’s reputation for sexual license and her sexual history
were seen as relevant to her credibility as a witness and to the issue of consent.77 Most
common law countries have enacted legislation that bars the defense from bringing up
evidence of a victim’s sexual history.78 Canada’s Criminal Code makes it impermissible
to challenge the credibility of a complainant by adducing evidence of her sexual
reputation.79 Australia80 and England have almost identical statutes.81At the federal level
evidence of past sexual behavior is generally inadmissible in the United States.82 Most
states have adopted similar legislation.83
Regardless of where rape shield laws exist, the goal is the same: to protect women
from further victimization by the legal process. The Canadian Supreme Court
summarized the goal of rape shield laws “The rape shield amendments strongly evidence
Parliament’s desire to instate guidelines to prevent the diversion of sexual assault trials
into inquiries into the moral character and past behavior of the complainant.84”
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International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ITCY include a vague and rather
opened provision that limits cross-examination of a witness. Rule 75(C) reads “a
chamber shall, whenever necessary, control the manner of questioning to avoid any
harassment or intimidation.”85 So far no cases have addressed how this rule should be
applied by the Tribunal. However, it does appear to grant the Tribunal the power to limit
the tone and kinds of questions asked of a witness in order to make her more comfortable.
Rule 96 of the ITCY Rules of Procedure and Evidence is the Tribunal’s version of
a rape shield provision. It provides that in cases of sexual assault “prior sexual conduct
of the victim shall not be admitted in evidence.”86 Such a provision is especially
important for a war crimes tribunal because it ensures that victims of sexual assault will
not be placed on trial themselves. Women who as a result of the military conflict were
forced to act as prostitutes (or made the choice on their own) will not have that
information presented in court. War often places women in compromising situations that
in the past have been used to defeat their claims of sexual assault. Rule 96 (iv) bars the
defendant from entering such evidence and shields women from certain cultural stigmas
relating to her moral fabric.
International Criminal Court
The principles of evidence in cases of sexual violence under the ICC are found in
Rule 70. According to this rule, the “credibility, character or predisposition to sexual
availability of a victim or witness cannot be inferred by reason of the sexual nature or the
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prior or subsequent conduct of a victim or witness.” This rule is support in rule 71, which
is almost a replica of Rule 70. Rule 71 states that “a Chamber shall not admit evidence of
the prior or subsequent sexual conduct of a victim or witness.87”
This provision is important because it reflects international acceptance of rape
shield laws. It is becoming more accepted in countries around the world as well as in the
international arena that it is unacceptable to place victims of sexual assault on trial. It
also shifts the focus of sexual assault from the perception of the attacker to that of the
victim.
Common law countries: Germany
The German Criminal Procedure Code does not have a rule that expressly
prohibits questions concerning a victim’s past sexual history. However, Chapter VI §
68a gives directions on “questions concerning degrading facts and previous convictions.”
Specifically §68a directs that “questions concerning facts which might dishonor the
witness or a person who is his relative…or which concern their personal sphere of life are
to be asked only if essential.88”
D. Police Protection, counseling measures and other methods of emotional support
to reduce witness trauma
United States
In the last twenty years, there has been what some commentators call a “victims’
movement” in the United States. This movement led to the enactment of The Victims of
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Crime Act of 1984. This act established a Crime Victims Fund that disburses monies to
state victim compensation funds and to victim assistance projects throughout the country.
As a result victim service programs are available in almost every state. These programs
include counseling, legal consultation, victim compensation and victim advocacy. Since
victims and witnesses are often synonymous in cases of sexual assault, these programs
help to create a less caustic environment for rape victims who join the judicial process.
The United States also has a federal witness relocation program that provides
witnesses whose safety is threatened with a new identity in a new location. The program
is most often utilized by witnesses in organized crime cases, but can extend to sexual
assault victims as well.
United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the rights and services afforded victims are found in the
Victim’s Charter. According to the Charter, as soon as a crime is reported the police
refer it to Victim Support. Victim Support is an independent registered charity that
receives its financial support from the government. Normally Victim Support will send
the victim a letter or phone her to arrange a visit within four working days of the reported
crime. Each victim is guaranteed confidentiality and is never charged for the services
provided by Victim Support. The service offers emotional support through counseling as
well as help with legal issues.
The Victim’s Charter also lays out the legal process and other services available
to victims. It outlines what the victims should expect once the criminal is apprehended,
how to be a witness and what court proceedings will be like. Witnesses who fear for their
safety are advised of the protection services available to them through the police.
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According to the Charter, witnesses may bring a friend for support when they testify or
have someone from the Witness Service accompany them to court. The Charter also
stipulates exactly how victims will be informed of the legal status of their case and the
release date of their attacker.89
The information and services embedded in the Victim’s Charter provide support
for victims of all kinds of crimes but especially those who have been sexually assaulted.
The Charter makes victims an essential part of the legal process and validates their
sacrifice by participating in it. Victims are not kept in the dark as in other jurisdictions or
some military tribunals. The Victim’s Charter empowers victims and encourages future
victims to participate in judicial proceedings.
International Tribunal for Yugoslavia
When the United Nations Security Council agreed to create the ITCY, they
directed the judges to create rules of procedure and evidence that would protect
witnesses. In response to this mandate the drafters included Rule 34 which creates a
Victims and Witnesses Unit. The Unit should consist of qualified staff to: “recommend
protective measures for victims and witnesses…” and to provide counseling and support
for them, in particular case of rape and sexual assault.90” The only other provision of the
Rule is that “due consideration [be] given, in the appointment of staff to the employment
of qualified women.”91
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As with many of the ITCY rules, Rule 34 lack specificity concerning how and
what the Victims and Witnesses Unit is expected to do. The success of Rule 34 is
dependent upon the resources afforded by the United Nations to the Tribunal. Currently,
the ITCY does not have the funds to support a police force to provide witnesses with
physical protection. It does provide a limited amount of counseling and support to
victims who are called to testify. Witnesses of sexual assault have complained that they
have not been given enough support and protection. Through no fault of its own the
ITCY in practice has been unable to carry out the proscriptions of Rule 34.
International Criminal Court
During the planning period of the ICC, the focus of many delegations was on
ways to protect victims and witnesses. NGOs lobbied extensively for provisions and
services that would both respect and support victims who came forward to participate in
the administration of justice. Perhaps in response to the disappointment of the ITCY’s
Victim and Witnesses Unit, the drafters of the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence
were much more specific about what they expected from their Victims and Witnesses
Unit. Again, since the ICC is still in the process of formalization it remains to be seen
how the provisions of the Victims and Witnesses Unit will play out. The success of the
unit will be directly dependent upon the monetary resources available to the ICC from
signature countries.
Under Rule 16 through the registrar, the ICC will provide victims and witnesses
with help in obtaining legal advice and representation.92 They will also create
“agreements on relocation and provision of support services.” Rule 17 provides for
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“adequate protective and security measures” and formulation of “long and short term
place for their protection.93” It also asks that the Unit assist witnesses in “obtaining
medical psychological and other appropriate assistance.” The Unit is responsible for
training all parties to the court in “issues of trauma, sexual violence, security and
confidentiality.94”
Rule 19 lays out the requirements for “expertise in the Unit.” The Unit will hire
“as appropriate persons with expertise in” witness protection and security, gender and
cultural diversity, and psychology in criminal proceedings among other things.95”
If the Victims and Witnesses Unit of the ICC is able to function at the full
capacity outlined in the Statute it will provide witnesses and victims with a full range of
protective measures. Not only will their physical safety be ensure, but they will also have
access to mental and legal support. These provisions along with the long term protective
measures promised by the Unit will help more victims come forward to testify against
their attackers. The existence of the Unit in no way impinges upon the rights of the
defense since it does not affect their right to confrontation, cross examination or create
prejudice against the defendant.
III. Conclusion
Finding rules of procedure and evidence that reduce trauma to witnesses is
imperative for the success for the International Tribunal for Rwanda. Unlike past
military tribunals, the ITCR (as wells as the ITCY) is extremely dependant upon witness
testimony to obtain their convictions. The Nuremberg prosecutors had the luxury of being
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able to depend upon extensive documentary evidence in order to obtain convictions. Such
evidence does not exist for the ITCR.
Witness anonymity does not impinge upon the right of the accused to confront all
witnesses. The accused is still granted an opportunity to cross-examine the witness even
if he is unaware of her identity. Furthermore, in the context of a war crime the actual
identity of the witness matter less than in domestic courts. Women in Rwanda were not
attacked because of who they were personally, but instead because of their ethnic
background. The goal of rape in war is not to attack the woman herself, but to defeat the
enemy without regard to their individual identities.
Rape shield laws also do not infringe upon the rights the accused. They simply
reflect a growing acceptance of the fact that all women deserve protection and have a
right to choose when and with whom they engage in sexual relations. The protection is
not diminished simply because a woman is a prostitute or not a virgin.
Finally, the services provided by witness and victims protection programs do not
harm the rights of the accused. They merely provide support and in no way stop the
accused from confronting the victim or examining them.
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